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CHAPTER 3
NEW ORDER IN BANKING1
Introduction
The smooth functioning of the economy requires a stable and effi cient oper-
ation of the fi nancial system. Poorly managed fi nancial institutions burden the 
fi nancial system. First, they adversely affect the rules and institutions of the public 
sector and, second, they grant loans to the wrong entities (denying loans to stable 
entities, which hampers the development of the economy) and excessively devel-
op lending activity (which may lead to fi nancial crises) [Kaufmann, 2002]. 
The fi nancial system is as strong as its governance practices, the fi nancial 
stability of its institutions and the effectiveness of its market infrastructure. The 
creation and application of good governance practices is the joint responsibility 
of market regulators and market participants [Das and Quintyn, 2002, p. 163]. 
However, there is no single effective remedy for all challenges to corporate gov-
ernance in the fi nancial sector. Empirical studies and theoretical considerations 
lead to the conclusion that in order to enhance corporate governance in banking it 
is necessary to ensure a stronger regulatory supervision, while also strengthening 
private oversight (market discipline): increasing transparency, the competitive-
ness of markets and the involvement of the owners [Litan et al., 2002, p. 13]. 
The recent crisis has exposed many areas of imperfection in the system of cor-
porate governance in banks. This publication identifi es the key areas of ineffi cien-
cy of the system and attempts undertaken to reform it, and presents a discussion 
of the desired new foundations of the fi nancial order.
1.  Identifi cation of the causes of corporate governance 
 ineffectiveness and attempts to reform the system
There are many macro- and microeconomic causes of the 2008 collapse of 
the fi nancial markets and the global economy. Of great importance was the ex-
cessive accumulation of risk in the fi nancial system resulting from weaknesses in 
* University of Lodz, Poland.
1 Paper is part of the project fi nanced by the National Science Center.
56
the corporate governance system in fi nancial institutions, and especially in banks 
[European Parliament, 2011]. 
The fi nancial crisis has exposed the weaknesses of corporate governance in 
banks. Some think that the crisis was brought about by inadequate implementation 
of corporate governance codes and principles; others argue that at least in part it 
was caused by a systemic failure of corporate governance (its institutional system 
is based on popular paradoxical assumptions, such as the primacy of shareholders, 
profi t maximization, effective system of incentives, effective market for corporate 
control, etc.) [Sun et al., 2011, p. 5].
Moreover, it is pointed out that the fundamental problem of corporate govern-
ance in banks results from the lack of a direct relationship between the principles 
of corporate governance and fi nancial stability. Indeed, the instruments of corpo-
rate governance contribute to the achievement of intermediate objectives at the 
level of individual institutions, but are not directly related to fi nancial stability 
[Wymeersch, 2008]. There is no obligation imposed on banks, and they are not 
motivated in any other way, to care for fi nancial stability or reduce systemic risk.
A detailed analysis of the causes of the crisis shows a number of corporate 
governance issues which require fundamental changes and tighter standards, 
namely [Kirkpatrick, 2009; Turner, 2009; Walker, 2009; Institute of International 
Finance, 2008; European Commission, 2010b; OECD, 2009; OECD, 2010; Mar-
cinkowska, 2010]: 
 ● The role, tasks and responsibilities of the board, as well as its size, organiza-
tion and composition (qualifi cations of the members) and the functioning of 
this body and assessment of its work;
 ● Control of the risk incurred by the bank;
 ● Assessment of the management and systems of incentive compensation for its 
members;
 ● Transparency of the bank that would enable supervisory assessment of its ope-
rations (both through institutional supervision and private monitoring);
 ● The bank’s ownership structure and the role of institutional investors.
These issues have been the subject of discussion of many decision-making 
bodies; some of them have already been taken into account in the new regulations 
and guidelines, while many more new regulations are still being developed.
As early as February 2009, a group of experts chaired by Jacques de Larosière 
recommended developing a European system of fi nancial supervisors [The 
High-level Group of Financial Supervision in the EU, 2009]. In September 2009, 
a new supervisory structure was introduced (which started operations in Janu-
ary 2011): The European System of Financial Supervisors – ESFS, consisting 
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of bodies supervising banks (the European Banking Authority), insurance com-
panies and pension funds (the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority) and stock exchanges (the European Securities and Markets Authority) 
operating in the EU. The European Systemic Risk Board is another component of 
this structure.2
Among the new regulations one should fi rst mention an EU initiative: in June 
2010 the Green Paper on corporate governance in fi nancial institutions and remu-
neration policies was published [European Commission, 2010c]. The document 
summarizes the areas of ineffectiveness and imperfections of corporate govern-
ance in banks (they are included in the list given above), points to the already 
undertaken preliminary legislative initiatives, and then presents, for consultation 
purposes, possible further solutions. The initiatives mainly concern the question 
of responsibility, independence and competence of the supervisory board. They 
strengthen the risk management function, enhance the status of the chief risk of-
fi cer, introduce a new requirement for external auditors to alert the board of di-
rectors and bank supervisory authorities to any substantial risks they discover, 
enhance bank supervision, promote a greater involvement of the bank’s share-
holders and encourage them to exercise effective control. These initiatives also 
concern the issues of remuneration for the management and confl icts of interest. 
The Green Paper is accompanied by a working paper which shows best practices 
related to supervisory boards, risk management, owners, supervisors, and external 
auditors [European Commission, 2010a].
Prior to that, back in 2009, The Commission issued a Recommendation on 
remuneration policies in the fi nancial sector [European Commission, 2009].3 The 
general requirement for banks was to adopt such remuneration policies that would 
promote correct and effective risk management, would not encourage excessive 
risk taking, and at the same time would support the implementation of business 
strategies and reduce confl icts of interest. In particular, the Recommendation de-
fi ned guidelines on determining the variable component of remuneration. 
Furthermore, the European Commission developed new regulations whose 
primary aim was to ensure more effective risk management in European credit 
institutions. These should help prevent individual credit institutions from taking 
2 More: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fi nances/committees/index_en.htm.
3 In Poland, the recommendations were refl ected in the resolution of the Polish Financial Supervision 
Authority (PFSA) No. 258/2011 dated 04.10.2011 The resolution replaces the PFSA resolution No. 
383/2008 on detailed rules for the functioning of the risk management and internal control system 
and the specifi cs of estimating internal capital by banks and reviewing the process of assessing and 
maintaining internal equity, and the principles for determining the policy for variable components 
of remuneration of banking executives (the PFSA Offi cial Journal, No. 11, pos. 42).
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excessive risk, which could otherwise lead to excessive risk accumulation in the 
fi nancial system. The new legal framework will have three operational objectives 
[European Parliament, 2011]:
 ● To increase the effectiveness of the board’s control over risk;
 ● To improve the status of the risk management function;
 ● To ensure effective monitoring of risk management by supervisory bodies.
Among the global guidelines for banking reform, one should mention further 
initiatives of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). First of all, 
attention should be paid to sectoral “good practices”, which take into account the 
specifi c nature of banks. General rules aimed at improving corporate governance 
in banks were updated by the BCBS in October 2010, and the current version of 
the document sets out 14 principles in 6 areas [BCBS, 2010d]: 
 ● Board practices;
 ● Senior management;
 ● Risk management and internal controls;
 ● Compensation;
 ● Complex or opaque corporate structures;
 ● Disclosure and transparency;
This document is further augmented with guidelines for the internal audit 
function in banks [BCBS, 2011b], which specify 20 principles concerning super-
visory expectations in relation to the internal audit function, the relations of in-
ternal audit with the supervisory institution, and supervisory assessment of the 
internal audit function.
The issue of remuneration for members of the top management in banks was 
also taken into account in the Basel guidelines, as the document formulates com-
pensation principles and standards for assessments methodology [BCBS, 2010c]. 
Criticism of the regulations on capital adequacy has led to the revision of the 
previous guidelines (Basel II); the BCBS has strengthened some of the require-
ments and introduced additional standards in this area (some of them are related to 
institutional and private supervision exercised over banks) [BCBS, 2010a; BCBS, 
2010b].
The Basel guidelines are the basis for the development and revision of regula-
tions in the European Union. In September 2011, the European Banking Authority 
published guidelines on internal governance4. 
4 The EBA document repeals the earlier guidelines published by the CEBS (the EBA’s predecessor) 
[CEBS, 2010; CEBS, 2009; CEBS, 2006] .
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2. Ethical foundations for a new order of the fi nancial market
Regardless of the identifi ed causes of the global fi nancial crisis, i.e., econom-
ic, regulatory, and political factors, it must be stressed that low moral standards 
and a departure from ethical principles in banking were the crucial causes of the 
development and spread of the crisis – “fi nancial bankruptcy is accompanied by 
intellectual and moral bankruptcy” [Flejterski, 2010].
“Greed”, “avarice”, and “lust for profi t”, which by the end of the twentieth 
century became the key business message (wrapped in the philosophy of gener-
ating shareholder value), have led to the erosion of moral values in the economy 
[Visser, 2010, p. 232].5 The obsession with fi nancial performance and the dogma 
of higher profi ts and higher returns on capital corrupt managers, weaken the com-
pany, and consequently – the whole social fabric, degrading humanitarian values 
and leading to immorality and corruption [Dembiński, 2011, p. 147; Minzberg, 
2004].6
Again, the issue of honesty becomes the key problem in the economy. A sys-
tem of corporate governance should be founded on honesty, understood not only 
as legality (referring to a system of law which may demand good behaviours by 
penalizing bad ones), ethics (referring to agreed standards as to which attitudes 
are desirable and which are undesirable) and morality (referring to generally ac-
cepted social norms of what is desirable or undesirable, good or bad). Honesty 
must encompass at once legality, ethics and morality. M. Jensen has even added 
honesty to the set of major factors of production, highlighting its importance for 
increasing the effi ciency of the organization [Cressy et al., 2010, pp. 117-120]. 
Ethics and morality can support the mechanisms of corporate governance and 
must become the foundation for systemic changes.
It should be stressed that ethical issues in the world of fi nance concern four 
levels [Gasparski et al., 2004, pp. 23-24]:
 ● Individual behaviour – the responsibility of specialists acting as representati-
ves (agents), such as bankers, managers, etc.;
 ● Institutional behaviour – rules and standards set by fi nancial organizations, 
stock exchanges, government regulatory institutions, etc.;
5 “The global fi nancial crisis represents a multi-level failure of responsibility – from the individual 
and corporate level to the fi nance sector and entire capitalist system.” [Visser, 2010, p. 232]. The 
author describes “a culture of greed embedded in the DNA of the company and fi nancial markets”, 
and proposes as a remedy a revived system of corporate social responsibility.
6 The authors criticize the current trends in management education and practice and shows the con-
sequences: corruption of the educational process, corruption of managerial practice, corruption of 
established organizations, and corruption of social institutions.
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 ● Corporate behaviour – people who are responsible for corporations (corpo-
rate executives) must act in the interest of the owners, who are not so much 
responsible for the social damage caused by their corporations (in the broader 
sense these issues are related to corporate governance);
 ● Global behaviour – in particular, issues of inequality in the distribution of 
wealth and poverty, responsibility of the developed countries for assistance to 
the less-developed ones.
Incentives for ethical behaviour may come from a variety of sources, and may 
have an impact at different levels: from individual incentives (the ethical and mor-
al values of individuals) and occupational (professional) incentives, to incentives 
at the level of organization (these are practical measures stimulating and obliging 
employees to comply with applicable principles, regulations, laws, and ethical 
standards), to market and regulatory incentives (imposing sanctions and penalties 
on organizations and individuals who engage in  unethical and unacceptable be-
haviour) [Razaee, 2007, p. 447].
It is crucial for the ethical attitude of organizations to create an adequate ethical 
climate, that is, stable, psychologically signifi cant, shared perceptions  employees 
hold concerning ethical procedures and policies existing in their company (based 
on observations rather than feelings or attitudes) [Wimbush and Shepard, 1994, 
pp. 637-647]. This ethical climate may be different in various organizations, de-
pending on the particular interests of individual employees and teams, friendship 
between employees and their morality, social responsibility of the organization 
and its profi tability and operational effi ciency, as well as on principles, standard 
procedures, regulations and codes [Sims, 1992, pp. 505-513]. And it is exactly 
the strong ethical culture of a bank that can complement the formal instruments 
of corporate governance. It is stressed that this is all the more important in the co-
operative sector, where market mechanisms (corporate governance) do not work 
and do not discipline organizations to behave appropriately [Diacon and Ennew, 
1996, pp. 623-634].
Honesty in the world of business means not abusing trust and performing the 
duties which are assigned to participants of the fi nancial market [Jackson, 1999, 
p. 13]. Still, the growing gap between fi nancial institutions and their surrounding 
obscures the sense of responsibility of fi nancial entities [Dembiński, 2004, p. 54].7
In the construction of ethical banking rules of key importance are [Dembiński, 
2004, p. 58]:
7 The author points here to the paradox of misconceived responsibility: there is massive responsibility 
because of the assets involved and a diffused awareness of this responsibility due to the technologi-
cal and institutional isolation of the fi nancial institution.
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 ● Personal ties between customers and operators;
 ● Charts and codes of ethics;
 ● Regulations for fi nancial markets.
It seems, therefore, that the optimal solution would be to merge the corpo-
rate governance system with the ethical culture of institutions. Previously, ethics 
was rarely seen as the foundation of corporate governance [Sullivan, 2009, p. 
3]. However, it may be argued that there is an interaction here which promotes 
building an appropriate framework for the operation of all entities. The adopted 
principles and codes of ethics support the organization’s responsible attitude to-
wards its stakeholders, which is the essence of corporate governance. At the same 
time, an effective system of corporate governance helps observe the code of ethics 
implemented by the institution.
A. Bhimani argues that codes of corporate governance promote certain ethi-
cal values and principles as well as some moral aspects of the proper conduct of 
individuals and organizations. These codes, taking into account the concepts of 
neoclassical economics, by defi nition introduce the dimension of moral values 
and ethical ideals in their economically rationalist argument [Bhimani, 2008, pp. 
135-147].
Ethical choices within corporate governance are in particular related to how, to 
what extent, and in relation to whom the basic “virtues” of corporate governance 
(i.e., the principles concerning duties, responsibility, honesty and transparency) 
are adhered to. The moral choices (judgments) made in this area are determined 
by differences in the models of corporate governance. They concern the scope of 
stakeholders and their expectations to be complied with by the bank and the extent 
to which these expectations will be incorporated in the bundle of the bank’s objec-
tives. Moral judgments are also refl ected in the criteria for assessing the success 
of the organization by attaching importance to the following issues: economic 
and operational effi ciency, involvement of the stakeholders and creating a kind of 
“corporate citizenship”, and, fi nally, reduction of the imbalance between different 
groups of stakeholders. 8
Many argue that corporate codes of ethics can constitute an effective mecha-
nism for governance by providing guidelines for economic attitudes. In particular, 
such codes are important when other instruments (market mechanisms, state in-
tervention, and social and ethical climate) have not brought about socially optimal 
effects [Thomson, 2001]. Regulations are not always effective and not always 
help to enhance enterprise value. Thus, management ethics, ethical education, or 
social norms will often have better results than strict rules [He and Ho, 2011]. 
8 More in West  [2009].
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However, codes of ethics, despite being meant to control behaviour and attitudes, 
cannot be a substitute for morality, culture, and character [Razaee, 2007, p. 440]. 
It is worth noting that research carried out in mature economies has shown 
that organizations with good corporate governance achieve good results regard-
less of their regulatory environment [Bruno and Claessens, 2010]. It can therefore 
be concluded that of greatest importance are internal motivators of good corporate 
governance. But in a model based on self-regulation it is necessary to ensure in-
ternal and external supervision in order to enforce corporate governance require-
ments [Weismann, 2009]. 
An interesting example of promoting corporate honesty and social responsi-
bility is the incorporation of this idea into the Dutch corporate governance code. 
9 It is worth noting that the core perspective of the code is “that a company is a 
long-term alliance between the various parties involved in the company.” There-
fore, this model strongly emphasizes the perspective of stakeholders: the manage-
ment and supervisory boards are responsible for taking into account the interests 
of different groups, and corporate social responsibility is seen as a component of 
the company’s primary strategy. It should be noted that in the original draft code 
the recommendations were even broader and suggested that institutional investors 
(including mutual funds) should increase their transparency regarding ESG issues 
(environmental, social and corporate governance). The fi nal version of the Code 
contains a provision requiring the shareholders to act in accordance with the prin-
ciples of “reasonableness and fairness.”
3. What kind of corporate governance rules should be adopted 
 by banks?
It is essential for the construction of a new fi nancial order to establish a reg-
ulatory strategy enhancing the stability of the operations of banks. This requires 
identifying critical areas of ineffi ciency in the existing regulations. The four most 
signifi cant problems include [Acharya and Richardson, 2009, p. 25]:
 ● Banks are encouraged to undertake excessive risk;
 ● Regulatory safeguards are poorly designed and inadequately valued, resulting 
in the problem of institutions too big to fail;
 ● Growing opacity and the resulting counterparty credit risk externalities
 ● Existing regulations focus on the risks of individual institutions rather than on 
systemic risk.
9 More in Lambooy [2010].
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These observations give rise to some overarching principles which should 
guide the regulations currently being developed [Acharya and Richardson, 2009, 
p. 30]: 
 ● Strengthening internal management and internal audit within institutions and 
adjusting remuneration policy so as to reduce excessive risk-taking and dimi-
nish the level of fi nancial leverage;
 ● Fair valuation of government guarantees and their exclusion in certain cases;
 ● Increasing transparency in order to reduce counterparty credit risk externalities;
 ● Implementing prudential regulations for large, complex fi nancial institutions, 
based on their contribution to the risk of the fi nancial system.
The fact that the fi nancial sector is better developed and more stable [Barth 
et al., 2004] in countries whose governments support the private sector’s ability to 
monitor banks is the starting point for the regulatory and supervisory authorities 
to determine the strategy for improvement of governance in banks. Thus, the sta-
bility of banks is founded not only on support for regulations and institutional su-
pervision, but also for private monitoring (market discipline). Moreover, in order 
to improve corporate governance in banks, it is necessary to introduce strong and 
clear incentives for owners, creditors and supervisors so that they would properly 
carry out their tasks of monitoring and disciplining banks if the banks should take 
excessive risk [Capiro and Levine, 2002, p. 42].
The risk of over-regulation of the fi nancial sector should be emphasized here. 
Although at the moment there is a consensus on the need to strengthen legal norms 
in order to prevent another signifi cant increase in risk, it is also argued that it 
would be dangerous to create too many regulations or badly designed ones. Such 
regulations would lead to reduced effi ciency and effectiveness of the fi nancial sys-
tem. And if the new regulations constrain innovation, which would otherwise ben-
efi t companies and individual customers, they could have adverse consequences 
for future economic growth [Mishkin, 2010]. 
Drafting new regulations for the functioning of the banking sector is nowadays 
an extremely diffi cult task – in the face of pressure to tighten regulation, increase 
supervision or even take “retaliatory” measures against banks, it is diffi cult to fi nd 
a happy medium between dangerous under-regulation and dangerous over-regu-
lation. As pointed out by the European Banking Federation, “policy-makers will 
need to strike a delicate balance between their instinctive reaction in times of 
stress to regulate and control on the one hand; and on the other, the need to pre-
serve the fi nancial sector’s ability to serve the economy and society” [EBF, 2010, 
p. 2]. 
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The EBF has developed principles that should guide the changes that are be-
ing currently introduced and are addressed both to regulators and supervisors, as 
well as the banking sector. These rules cover nine areas [EBF, 2010, p. 2]: 
 ● Banking in an open market economy – Reforms should respect the values of 
openness, the freedom of capital movement, the freedom of establishment and 
a level playing fi eld among fi nancial institutions. 
 ● Properly supervised banking – The model of banking supervision must ensure 
stability and functionality of the markets, as well as being in step with modern 
banking.
 ● Truly commercial banking – Banks must remain commercial in nature; there-
fore, the crisis-induced public intervention needs to be withdrawn as quickly 
as possible, in a coordinated and market-sensitive way. Enduring government 
intervention in the fi nancial system harbours the danger of deactivating mar-
ket mechanisms and distorting competition.
 ● Banking without size prescription – To make banking safer, policy-makers 
should focus on the systemic aspects of fi nancial institutions rather than on 
their size. (This relates to an institution’s activities, the legal underpinning of 
its component units, its business model and the scale and nature of intercon-
nectedness with others).
 ● Diverse banking models – The prescription of a specifi c banking model would 
limit innovative and successful business. Stable relations are important for 
banks – and a variety of banking profi les can offer this. Structural principles 
(legal form, regional principle, mandatory group membership) should not be 
prescribed.
 ● Customer-oriented banking – European regulators should continue to focus on 
banking customers, and in this regard there is a need to increase transparency 
and build confi dence, notably in the fi eld of credit intermediaries and infor-
mation to consumers. The crisis has highlighted the importance of fi nancial 
education.
 ● Robust banking – The banking business is highly sensitive to changes in ca-
pital requirements. Over-zealous tightening of the capital regime could have a 
dramatic impact on banking as well as on the economy (particularly if atten-
tion is not paid to the cumulative effect of the changes). Capital requirements 
must be appropriately calibrated to ensure stability and avoid a reduction in 
the availability of credit and other fi nancial resources to the wider economy.
 ● Sustainable banking – Banks and other fi nancial institutions must continue 
to re-examine the role they play in fi nancing the growth of the real economy 
and enhancing fi nancial stability. The banking business is crucially dependent 
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on public trust. Both the public good and the capacity of providers to fulfi l 
their mandates in a competitive, effi cient and cost-effective way, can be impa-
ired by defi ciencies in professional integrity, transparency and accountability. 
Banks must further improve risk management, align remuneration and com-
pensation schemes with long-term value creation and gear incentive structures 
more strongly to customers’ wishes and their long-term corporate interest.
 ● Adaptable banking – Banks must develop robust strategies to be able to adapt 
to continuously evolving market conditions and changes in the demand for 
banking services. Adaptability and creativity in such fi nancial areas as change 
of funding sources, collateral shortages, improved securitization activity, as 
well as in harnessing technology, will help banks to better assist society in 
facing its own challenges.
In fact, the principles promoted by the EBF relate to the development of a 
banking system based on a regulation–self-regulation continuum. As the former 
head of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), H. Davies, rightly observed, no 
system of corporate governance will work effi ciently without the involvement 
of shareholders. Regulators cannot be a substitute for interested and responsible 
owners, but they can to some extent support and complement them [Davies, 2003]. 
On the other hand, a set of voluntarily accepted recommendations and best 
practices cannot be an alternative to reliable oversight – both components com-
plement each other and must co-exist together in order to create a stable, strong 
and dynamic global fi nancial system [Ackermann, 2008]. The same regulations 
may in fact produce different effects, depending on the existing corporate gov-
ernance structures in banks [Laeven and Levine, 2009]. In addition, one should 
bear in mind that incentives for the development of good corporate governance 
can be distorted in the face of fi nancial threats and crises. Thus, it is all the more 
important to support regulatory governance with institutional structures of greater 
independence and transparency, i.e., to ensure best governance practices in super-
visory institutions themselves [Das and Quintyn, 2002].
Therefore, one should seek an optimal balance between the regulation of the 
fi nancial sector and the promotion of self-regulation. Neither regulations alone or 
corporate governance mechanisms alone can guarantee success. The best results 
can be achieved by supervisory regulations supporting strong corporate govern-
ance based on ethical foundations.
New order in banking
66
Conclusion
The global fi nancial crisis has demonstrated the need for new paradigms, es-
pecially those pertaining to “a balance between economic freedom and discipline, 
competition and cooperation, self-regulation and intervention, centralization and 
decentralization, private and public ownership, self-fi nancing and public fi nanc-
ing, current and future consumption” [Frąckowiak, 2011, p. 81]. Indeed, it is nec-
essary to redefi ne the role and organization of the state, society and the economy, 
and determine points of equilibrium anew.
There is no doubt that ethics and a sense of responsibility supported by a 
stronger regulatory system and improved supervisory institutions (and mac-
ro-prudential supervision) should be the core elements of an improved, stable 
and responsible fi nancial system [European Commission, 2010d]. Legal standards 
should only serve as a support for grass-roots initiatives. It is unrealistic to expect 
that the monitoring and supervision of complex fi nancial markets and institutions 
may be based solely on regulations, but this does not mean that the state may 
abandon these processes. An effective regulatory regime must be based on the 
desire of banks (and other institutions) to maintain high management standards 
and values as part of their corporate culture [Tomasic, 2011, p. 52]. 
Corporate governance, especially in the banking sector, should ensure that 
organizations are concerned with the good of all their stakeholders. However, 
honesty, transparency and responsibility must be mutual in nature [Marcinkows-
ka, 2010]. 
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